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Abstract 
At a time when the economic recession is more severe, and trade unions are weaker, than at 
any time since the War, it would be unproductive to speculate about the extent to which these 
changes have been imposed, acquiesced, or agreed by the workers concerned. Instead we 
focus on recent changes in employment relationships in Britain, and their consequences, and 
then on the winners and losers, which provides a cue for considering the longer term 
desirability of some of these developments for social justice and cohesion. 
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One of the most striking features of the recession of 2009-2010 has been the apparent 
willingness of employees to accept changes in their terms and conditions of employment in 
order to retain their jobs. By early 2010, a number of observers had begun to ask whether this 
new adaptability of pay and working patterns to accommodate the drop in demand had 
contributed to the relatively small impact of the first wave of the recession on employment 
compared with previous major recessions (Gregg, 2011). In this paper, we examine current 
evidence behind this claim, albeit fragmentary, and argue that this new-found adaptability has 
its origins in a number of institutional changes that have been gathering momentum over the 
past two decades. We also consider the winners and losers. 
Nickell (2011) and Gregg (2011) show that the initial impact of recession on 
employment had been much less severe than expected. The Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) has produced a detailed comparison with the early impact on employment of the 
current recession compared with previous deep recessions, and although it is too early to rule 
out a ‘double-dip’, there is reasonable prima facie evidence that labour market adjustment has 
changed (ONS, 2010). The other notable observation, which may be related, is that pay 
reductions absorbed a good deal of the recession’s initial impact, with average weekly 
earnings for the whole economy crashing at an annualised rate of 5% in the early months of 
2009 (Figure 1).  
These aggregate statistics are reflected in the experience of many individual 
companies, according to reports in the press. In February 2009, Toyota attracted national 
attention by announcing a freeze of pay and bonuses shortly after BMW and Vauxhall 
announced stringent cut backs in their UK plants (Financial Times 19/02/2009). Honda 
followed with similar announcements of pay cuts in March (The Times 24/3/09), in July, the 
BBC reported that BT was seeking pay cuts in exchange for more holidays (BBC 
04/07/2009), and in January 2010, the Guardian reported that some employers were using the 
recession to claw back paid leave arrangements (Guardian 07/01/2010). 
Some of these adjustments may be accepted voluntarily. Some workers may prefer a 
temporary pay cut in order to keep their jobs for the longer term. It is possible that, after a 
decade of policies to foster employee commitment in many organisations, employees’ 
attitudes have changed, and that they trust their employers that short-term pain will be 
rewarded by long-term gain. However, it may not be that simple: a recent CIPD survey shows 
that as few as one third of British employees trust their senior managers (CIPD 2010). It may 
be that weakened unions no longer offer their traditional opposition to pay cuts. There may 
also be a greater readiness by employers to cut benefits in a way they did not do so in the 
past. The degrading of superannuation schemes has, for example, been a feature of this 
period. At a time when the economic recession is more severe, and trade unions are weaker, 
than at any time since the War, it would be unproductive to speculate about the extent to 
which these changes have been imposed, acquiesced, or agreed by the workers concerned. 
Instead we focus on recent changes in employment relationships in Britain, and their 
consequences, and then on the winners and losers, which provides a cue for considering the 
longer term desirability of some of these developments for social justice and cohesion. 
 
 
2. Recent Change in British Employment Relationships 
 
The changes to be reviewed might be categorised broadly into those of substantive and of 
procedural individualisation (see Brown et al 1998). The first concerns the extent to which 
the actual content of employment contracts has become more diverse in terms for example of 2 
 
hours worked, pay received, job descriptions, and contractual status. The second concerns the 
extent to which the procedures whereby these contracts are determined has become less a 
matter of collective bargaining and more one in which the employer deals with the employee 
as an individual, frequently imposing the terms without negotiation. 
A powerful driver of change in recent years has been structural change. Over the 
quarter century of trade union collapse since 1980, the proportion of all employees in 
manufacturing, the heartland of private sector collectivism, fell from 38 per cent to 15 per 
cent in 2004. The proportion employed in the heavily collective public sector fell from 36 per 
cent to 28 per cent. The proportion of the workforce employed in the thinly unionised private 
services sector rose from a quarter to over a half (Brown et al 2009: 17). The size of 
workplace in which people were employed, commonly associated with collectivism, fell in 
manufacturing, although it rose in private services. 
The diversity of employment contracts has increased substantially. The proportion of 
the workforce who were primarily self-employed rose from 8 per cent in 1980 to 13 per cent 
in 2010. The increase in part-time employment was from 14 per cent to 27 per cent over the 
same period, closely linked to the rise in female employment. The proportion of workplaces 
where at least half the workers were part-timers rose from 13 per cent to 28 per cent of the 
total. The use of fixed-term contracts rose. The proportion of workplaces using fixed term 
contracts of less than a year rose from about one in five to one in three (Brown and Edwards, 
2009: 17). There has also been a rise in employment through agencies. Both these trends have 
been particularly marked in the public sector. The proportion of workers on contracts without 
any defined working hours has risen, as has that of those on annualised hours. Overtime 
working, typically with a high degree of employee discretion, has diminished. Overall, the 
employment contract has, in summary, become more flexible, and with this flexibility more 
under the control of the employer. 
It is not only that there is greater variability of contract, but also of pay within those 
contracts. During the 1980s there was a sharp rise in the practice of making some components 
of pay contingent on outcomes: linking pay to individual or work-group performance, or to 
company profits, or introducing employee share ownership schemes. And although 
enthusiasm for such schemes has waned somewhat more recently, for the economy as a 
whole the proportion of workplaces with some sort of contingent pay scheme rose from 41 
per cent in 1984 to 55 per cent in 2004. For the private sector alone that increase was from 52 
per cent to 67 per cent. The growth in profit-related pay was a particularly notable feature of 
the 1980s. It had been officially encouraged for a time by tax incentives, but continued after 
they were withdrawn. By 2004, profit-related pay covered 45 per cent of private sector 
workplaces, more than twice the 20 per cent it had stood at in 1984. In brief, a major reason 
for pay becoming more flexible in the present recession is simply that pay systems had been 
introduced which made it contractually more flexible and contingent upon individual and 
company performance. Another feature of recent years is one of increased diversity of 
contingent pay schemes within single workplaces; incentives are being shaped more 
specifically to the potential of particular jobs and technologies (Pendleton and Whitfield, 
2009). No negotiation or managerial diktat would have been necessary to achieve many of 
the pay cuts of the past couple of years (Figure 1). They would have been simply an intended 
and expected consequence of the tougher product market. 
 
 
3. The Collapse of Procedural Collectivism 
 
The recent increase in the diversity and flexibility of employment contracts, and in the extent 
to which they are employer-designed, is both a consequence and a cause of the decline of 3 
 
organised labour. The scale of that collapse is hard to exaggerate. The proportion of the 
employed workforce in trade unions collapsed from around 55 per cent to around 30 per cent 
between 1980 and 1996, after which it drifted slowly down to 28 per cent in 2007. But the 
decline in the coverage of collective bargaining has been both more extreme and more 
remorseless. If we look just at the private sector, the proportion of workplaces where 
management engages in any collective bargaining fell from 47 per cent to 38 per cent 
between 1984 and 1990, the main period of anti-union legislation and public confrontations. 
But it fell further to 24 per cent in 1998, and it continued its fall at undiminished rate after 
New Labour was elected, to 16 per cent in 2004. Relatively little of this retreat can be 
attributed to structural change in the economy and to the contraction of traditionally highly 
unionised sectors. It has been clearly demonstrated that the overwhelming driver has been 
increased competition within individual product markets (Brown et al, 2009). Firm by firm 
and sector by sector, employers have responded to tougher competition by tightening controls 
over work, and either refusing to deal with trade unions at all or doing so only on the basis 
that their role is one of passive consultation or of positive contribution to improved 
productivity. 
Trade unions have responded in kind. It is not just that strike levels tumbled by the 
end of the 1980s to lower levels than in recorded history and stayed there: the annual number 
of strikes recorded per million union members had averaged around 250 in the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s, halved in the 1980s, and fell to and remained at a tenth of it in the 2000s. The 
sectoral location of strikes also changed. Over the past decade the vast majority of working 
days lost in strikes are in the public sector; in the private sector strikes have become a rarity. 
Trade unions in the private sector have increasingly sought survival by co-operating with 
employers in their desire to enhance productivity and competitiveness. The officially 
encouraged ‘workplace partnership’ deals of the turn of the millennium were not a passing 
fad, although the terminology became electorally unattractive to union leaderships and fell 
from use. But de facto partnership deals are now the essence of private sector collective 
bargaining - and also a growing feature of the public sector.  
So far we have drawn attention to the fact that competitive pressures have 
transformed the form and content of employment contracts in the private sector, emphasising 
that this has been a substantially greater change than in the public sector. But this is not to say 
that the public sector has been unchanged; very far from it. For one thing the privatisations of 
the past thirty years have removed to the private sector some of the most renowned 
strongholds of trade union power, such as steel, car assembly, aerospace, ship-building, 
docks, airports, and coal mining. The evidence suggests that, far from unions’ preserving 
some of their traditional authority in these sectors, management withdrew from collective 
bargaining even more than in comparable sectors that had never been in state ownership 
(Brown, Bryson and Forth, 2009: 44). It is true that unions have retained a solid foothold in 
some privatised sectors – typically those characterised by ‘natural monopolies’ where there 
are official regulators: gas, water, electricity, communications and rail. But union influence 
over daily work organisation is none-the-less much diminished.  
Indeed, union influence has also diminished substantially in sectors that have 
remained public. In health, education, and local and central government, quasi-market 
pressures such as league tables, out-sourcing, trusts, competitive tendering, and other 
resource competitions have greatly reduced union influence. In some sectors where union 
control was substantial it has taken a struggle. For the prisons it took the introduction of 
private prisons to trigger a sea-change. In the fire and emergency services and the postal 
service it has been the failure of national strike action. The public sector remains distinctive 
in its attachment to collective bargaining. But the past twenty years have seen, for both pay 
fixing and wider management, a radical shift away from centralised, standardised 4 
 
arrangements, and towards greater discretion for local management and lesser involvement 
for unions (Bach, Givens and Forth, 2009). 
 
 
4. Consequences of Change 
 
A reflection of the decline in union influence is the change in the way that employers 
communicate with workers. Some sort of arrangement for this has been in place for over 80 
per cent of workplaces at least since the 1980s. But whereas at that time 66 per cent of those 
communication methods involved trade unions (and of that 24 per cent involved unions 
exclusively), by 2004, only 38 per cent involved trade unions (and a historically tiny 5 per 
cent trade unions exclusively). Management had come to dominate the communication 
process, through means such as consultative committees open to all employees, through 
problem solving groups, through employee opinion surveys and, notably, the use of team 
briefing, the use of which doubled from 36 per cent of workplaces in 1980 to 71 per cent in 
2004. The representative role of unions, even where they are recognised by management, had 
been substantially reduced (Willman, Gomez and Bryson, 2009). 
The implications of these developments for employment contracts have been massive. Much 
more is at the discretion of the employer alone: what employees are paid; what hours they 
work; when they work; whom they work with; what they do. Contracts, which in the 1980s 
might have had quite specific job descriptions carefully negotiated with trade unions, are now 
typically left vaguer, with letters of appointment describing the worker’s duties giving 
renewed emphasis to catch-all clauses of the sort ‘… and any other duties for which your 
manager considers you to be competent’. Between 1984 and 2004, the proportion of British 
private sector employees (in workplaces with 25 or more) whose pay was determined by 
management acting alone rose from 59 per cent to 85 per cent. For many of these workers, 
this would not in practice have meant ‘individual negotiation’ of any substance, or even ‘take 
it or leave it’, but ‘take it or leave’.  
Quite apart from institutional change, the extraordinary growth over this period of 
electronic surveillance capability – whether email records, CCTV, ‘satnav’ location 
techniques, electronic payment recording, or mobile phones – has immeasurably increased 
employers’ ability to monitor their employee’s conduct of work. For a wide swathe of jobs, 
technology has transformed the employer’s knowledge of and control over the worker’s 
execution of the employment contract. It is not that employers have the capacity routinely to 
analyse this unimaginable volume of data; what matters is that they have potential access to 
individual evidence to enforce contractual compliance through disciplinary procedures. That 
said, a potential casualty of undue monitoring of employees is the basis of trust between 
employer and employee upon which much work pride and quality depends. 
The shift in power towards employers has been reflected in some aspects of the 
experience of the workers. While pay has generally improved steadily in real terms over the 
past thirty years, it has also become more unequal, with consequent increases in 
dissatisfaction provoked by increased relative deprivation for many (Machin, 2011). Job 
security, measured in terms of involuntary job separations has generally increased, and 
despite a long period of deregulation, job tenures have proved relatively stable in the UK as 
in other major advanced economies (OECD, 1997 Ch. 5)
1. But some aspects of work have, 
overall, become less attractive to the employee. Workplace autonomy has tended to decrease 
(Gallie et al, 2004; Green and Whitfield, 2009). The perception that stress and work intensity 
are increasing, which was marked in the 1990s, has continued (Green, 2006; Green, 2008). 
                                                 
1 For an annual update see OECD Stat Extracts at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx. 5 
 
What about the growth of individual employment rights, it might be argued. Has not 
the several score of employee protections and entitlements that have been introduced in the 
past thirty years, around half as a result of EU influence, compensated for the decline in trade 
union influence and introduced new inflexibilities from the employer’s point of view? The 
answer is that, while these have indeed provided some compensation in terms of employee 
entitlements, there has been no substitution for the decline of trade union influence over the 
conduct of work. Rights against sexual, racial and disability  discrimination, against bullying 
and mispayment of wages, rights for maternity leave, family friendly policies, unfair 
dismissal entitlements, information and consultation rights, and so on, all increase the cost of 
employment. This has been manifest in the sharp growth in specialist human resource 
management: present in two-thirds of workplaces in 2004 compared with one half in 1980 
(Guest and Bryson, 2009: 125). Overall these rights have probably favoured employers with 
greater initial command of their workforces; the National Minimum Wage, for example, has 
probably shifted employment and market share away from employers who relied upon low 
pay to compete towards employers who rely more on competent employee management 
(Metcalf, 2008). But, for all but the more authoritarian and unscrupulous employers, these 
new employment rights do not compromise the power to manage. 
There is a sharp contrast with the collective bargaining practices of the past. We shall 
come in a moment to what trade unions achieved for their members in terms of wages and 
substantive conditions. But their achievements in terms of modifying the employer’s power 
to manage were considerable. British collective bargaining has always been distinctive by 
comparison with other European countries or, for example, the United States, Canada, or 
Japan, in the extent to which it offered union members influence over the immediate conduct 
of work (Fox 1985). By the 1970s, in both public and private sectors, more or less tacit 
negotiations at the workplace over manning levels, work rates, overtime, bonus payments, 
and even work methods, were commonplace. Conducted with employee representatives 
commonly called ‘shop stewards’, and backed by an awareness of the capacity for very local 
workplace collective action, these exercised substantial constraint over management. It is this 
distinctive characteristic of local control over the conduct of work which has diminished 
dramatically. For example, in 1980, of a representative sample of works managers 
responsible for manufacturing plants with 100 or more employees where trade unions were 
recognised, 40 per cent said they would normally negotiate with union representatives over 
the reallocation of work. In 1998 the comparable proportion reporting this was 4 per cent 
(Brown and Nash, 2008). Similar but more specific examples could be given across a wide 
range of sectors. It is not that local union influence over the conduct of work has diminished 
sharply everywhere – there are odd groups such as long-haul passenger aircraft pilots and 
theatrical stage-hands where it is still notable – but it has become very much the exception 
rather than the norm. Changes in employment laws have done nothing to sustain it. 
The shift in the character of trade unions, of collective bargaining, and of the control 
of work is clearly reflected in evidence of the economic consequences. It is reflected in 
wages. The ‘mark-up’ or apparent wage premium enjoyed by union members over non-
members had been around 10 per cent in the 1970s up to the early 1980s, falling to 
(according to Labour Force Survey data) 6 per cent for 1993-9, and further to 3 per cent for 
2000-6. It was, interestingly, more resilient in small workplaces of under 25 employees 
(where unionisation is relatively rare), standing at around 8 per cent in 2004 (Blanchflower 
and Bryson, 2009: 61 - 63). It was not only with wages that union influence diminished. In 
the early 1980s the evidence suggested that the presence of unions in an establishment was 
associated with relatively low employment growth there, possibly indicating an effect in 
discouraging investment. Whatever the reason, this disappears after 1990 (op. cit.: 65). And 
there is a similar pattern with regard to the financial performance. ‘Unions were associated 6 
 
with poorer financial performance in the early 1980s. But this difference has since 
disappeared, and it has been due to an improvement in the relative position of unionised 
workplaces rather than any deterioration among non-unionised workplaces’ (op. cit., 2009: 
68). More subjectively, managers’ perceptions of the rather fuzzy notion of ‘industrial 
relations climate’ followed a similar track, with unions being seen as detrimental in the 
1980s, but with such an effect disappearing from the later 1990s (op. cit.: 71). 
In summary, Britain entered the recession of 2009 with employment relationships that 
were remarkably altered by comparison with those prevailing in the recession of 1991, and 
even more with those of the recession of 1980. Contracts of employment had become more 
diverse in form, more contingent upon economic circumstances, more individualistic 
procedurally, and above all, far more under the control of employers. Little wonder that in 
2009 they permitted a more flexible response to the demands of product markets than at any 
time since the Depression of the 1930s. And because the driving force behind their change 
has been toughening product market competition, which has, more than anything else, 
undermined collective bargaining and the influence of trade unions, there is every reason to 
believe that this change has been irreversible.  
 
 
5. Winners and Losers of the Change 
 
The gap left by the erosion of the old system of joint regulation of the workplace and more 
generally of labour markets by collective actors is gradually being filled. In its place is a 
different system of regulation which gives primacy to the needs of individual organisations 
and their employees, and in that respect is more ‘market-oriented’. It is also less egalitarian, 
and many of the developments described above have disproportionately affected the workers 
who had gained most from joint regulation. Whether it is any more sustainable in the long-
run than the system it had displaced can be debated. Below, we set out some of the key 
elements, which also give lie to some of the winners and losers of these changes. 
First, the flexibility of nominal wages shown in Figure 1, if sustained into the future, 
stands in stark contrast to views of practitioners and labour economists of earlier generations. 
Keynes and Hicks both noted the received wisdom that the structure of relative wages in 
Britain’s unionised economy was a major obstacle to the downward flexibility of money 
wages. It was for this reason that Hicks (1955) argued that modern economies had moved 
from the gold standard to the ‘labour standard’ in which currency fluctuations had to bring 
about the adjustments in real wages that the labour market could no longer provide. Although 
it is too early to say definitively, it is hard to avoid drawing a connection between the fall in 
money wages in early 2009 and the apparent robustness of employment levels at the onset of 
the recession. Although financial and business services showed the biggest drops, they also 
occurred on a smaller scale in manufacturing and other services. The link with variable pay 
also seems highly plausible: the pay practice has been steadily spreading over the past two 
decades; and comparison of pay trends with and without bonuses shows clearly that bonuses 
provided nearly all the pay flexibility displayed in Figure 1. 
Before hailing this as the dawn of a benign new era, one should consider other 
evidence on the incidence of bonuses. One reason why workers have often opposed variable 
pay is that they have no cushion of savings and discretionary income to absorb drops in pay. 
A steady rate of pay, supplemented with overtime, made it possible to plan family budgets. 
Worker preferences such as these, influence the kind of pay system employers will offer 
when they compete to attract labour. Low income workers prefer the certainty of stable rates 
of pay. In contrast, high income workers, who can afford the associated risk, may well prefer 
variable pay, especially if they believe it will reward the success of their own efforts and that 7 
 
of their organisation. In fact, this is borne out in recent British earnings statistics. There is a 
strong correlation between the level of annual pay and the percentage annual bonus. This can 
be seen in median pay and bonus percent for detailed occupations shown in the ONS 2008 
and 2009 annual surveys of earnings and hours (ASHE).
 2  In other words, the much sought 
after flexibility of money wages in order to give greater job security can be found in today’s 
labour market, but mainly for higher paid occupations. 
Another notable feature of the emerging pattern of regulation is a change in the nature 
of employee voice. Again, we suggest this gives greater market flexibility, but also that it 
benefits mainly the better qualified and better paid. As collective union voice has declined in 
Britain since the early 1980s, so a new configuration of voice channels has developed. 
Occupational licensing and its related interest associations, as argued in Humphris, Kleiner 
and Koumenta (2011), have expanded in the US while trade unionism has declined. Their 
data suggest that British labour markets are experiencing a comparable change. Although the 
jury is still out on the net public benefits of licensing, there are notable parallels with old-
style craft unionism which controlled entry in order to regulate pay and working conditions. 
Licensing establishes common standards of training and performance, and in doing so it helps 
to create more flexible labour markets with a large pool of skills for employers, and it ensures 
that workers’ qualifications have wide currency across the labour market. In contrast, much 
employer-provided training is not transferable, so that when people lose their jobs they often 
have to step down the skill hierarchy. However, as Humphris and her co-authors point out, 
licensing benefits primarily higher paid workers. 
In their classic defence of the benefits of trade unions to the economy, Freeman and 
Medoff (1984) emphasise how employers can gain if their employees will share information 
with them about their jobs and the general functioning of the company. It helps to balance the 
one-sidedness of much information that filters up the managerial hierarchy, and so can boost 
productivity. Willman et al. (2009) show that employers’ demand for voice has not 
diminished, but to use Freeman and Medoff’s metaphor, it has emphasised only one of the 
‘two faces of unionism’: assisting the flow of information in the workplace, but not 
bargaining over pay. Thus we have seen an expansion of employer-led voice, such as 
consultation, quality circles, and workplace briefings, but these are all management-led, and 
their agenda is usually set by management. Part of the price of union-led voice is that the 
organisational imperatives of collective bargaining, which include building coalitions among 
disparate groups of workers, inevitably involve trade-offs in which the strong demonstrate 
solidarity with the weak. Metcalf et al (2001) show that typically, in Britain, unions have 
reduced pay inequalities among the groups they represent. Detaching ‘productivity’ voice 
from ‘bargaining’ voice should in principle enable employers to raise productivity, and they 
may then use this to reward the workers whose skills and continued loyalty matter most. In 
addition, as electronic personal communications become ever more potent as means of 
mobilising worker discontents, there are dangers for both employers and the wider society in 
the contraction of the representative infrastructures of unions which might permit elected 
representatives to manage those discontents. 
Although trends in individual employee voice are not available for the quarter century 
of union decline, the most recent WERS (2004) indicates that it is strongly associated with 
the effectiveness of their outside option. Thus, individual voice is greatest for employees with 
high levels of education, in skilled and professional occupations, who have been recently 
mobile, and who are highly paid in their occupation: factors that indicate a strong external 
                                                 
2 The correlations were 0.80 and 0.63 respectively for 2008 and 2009 for four-digit occupations, both significant 
at <1%. The 2009 figure may be lower because of the sharp fall in bonuses in February-March that year. The 
ASHE data relate to April. 
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labour market. Such workers were more likely to express confidence in the power of their 
individual voice in the workplace (Marsden 2010b). The same data suggest that effective 
individual voice is inversely related to collective union voice, whether in the form of 
workplace collective agreements, or workplace representatives, and is negatively related to 
measures of management-led voice, except for appraisal being linked to pay. Whether 
workers can literally choose between individual and collective voice is not clear. However, if 
they have limited time and effort to devote to voice activities, and union coverage has 
become patchy, it seems entirely logical that they should hone their individual voice skills 
and ensure they maintain a strong outside option. As noted in the CIPD survey cited earlier, 
most British workers do not trust their managers. Once again, in this new more market driven 
environment, the advantage lies with those employees who have the most marketable skills.  
A final institutional change that may lie behind greater pay flexibility has been the 
decline of strongly institutionalised entry routes to a number of occupations. This change may 
liberalise access, but it too has come with a price tag of increased inequality. Although these 
channels may have restricted increases in labour supply, one important advantage was that 
competition for entry took place over a relatively short time period. Those who did not get a 
training position with a top local employer were still young enough to try another company or 
a different occupation, and to start earning their living. Today, in a number of occupations 
such channels have declined and have been replaced by a prolonged period of competition in 
unstructured labour markets. Aspirant entrants to these occupations have to build up their 
personal networks, negotiate deals, take on low paid work or even unpaid internships to get 
known, and achieve the break that will bring them peer recognition and status as full 
members of the occupation (Marsden 2010a). Such prolonged entry tournaments open up 
supply, but also require financial support from families. As the Sutton Trust (2006) observed 
in the case of journalists, loss of the traditional entry routes meant that aspirants were 
dependent on family wealth, and so the occupation had become more elitist in recent years. 
Another feature of the extended competition for entry is that a number of workers become 
trapped in the fringes of these occupations having failed to gain entry to the prestigious core, 
but also having left it too late to train for a different occupation. Such people continue to 
depress the pay and conditions of those competing for entry. Thus once again, a move to 
more flexible and less institutionally regulated labour markets may be good for adjustment to 
shifts in demand, but they can also be socially regressive. 
In conclusion, the decline of organised union voice in Britain and of collective 
regulated employment practices may well have enabled pay and work practices to absorb 
some of the shock of the first wave of the recession, and so to protect employment levels, at 
least initially. As unemployment has such a scarring effect (as noted in other authors’ work 
referred to in this paper), this must be a significant gain. However, it has to be set against the 
price in terms of inequality. As Vignoles (2011) shows, inequality also scars as young people 
from deprived homes fare much worse in the educational system than their peers from better 
off homes. This is not an easy trade-off to decide, and without collective voice many of those 
most affected probably have little or no voice in this decision. The trade-off is not just one for 
national politicians, but also for employing organisations. The CIPD’s concern that so few 
British workers trust their employers was justified because many of the modern methods of 
human resource management depend upon winning employee motivation so that managers 
can rely on them to make good decisions that benefit their organisations. This requires a 
reasonable degree of trust on both sides. If workers feel that their managers’ willingness to 
listen to them depends upon their marketability, then the price that organisations pay will be 
more limited cooperation and commitment. Traditional forms of union-based collective voice 
may often have been adversarial, but they were not always so, and it is perhaps a mistake to 9 
 
let the experience of the 1970s and early 1980s colour one’s judgement for all time. These 
were years of intense social conflict as inflation undermined social cohesion.  10 
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Figure 1: Weekly earnings growth by sector (annual rate %): effect of bonuses 
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